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References  41Almost  without  exception,  economic  studies  of labor  migration  in less
developed  countries  (LDCs)  focus  on the  potential  contributions  that  migration
may  make  to the  absolute  in  zie  of the  relevant  migration  unit (the
individual,  the  fam.Ly,  or the  household). In contrast,  Stark  (1984)  has
hypothesized  that  rural-to-urban  migration  might  be undertaken  primarily  to
improve  an individual's  or a household's  comparative  income  position  with
respect  to that  of other  individuals  or  households  in the  relevant  reference
group  (for  example,  the  village).
In  a recent  study  Stark  and  Taylor  (1989)  found  empirical  evidence
that  the  initial  relative  deprivation  of households  in their  village  reference
group  plays  a significant  role  in  migration  from  Mexico  to the  United
States. Controlling  for  initial  absolute  income  and the  expected  income  gains
from  migration,  these  authors  showed  that  the  propensity  of households  to
participate  in  international  migration  is  directly  related  to the  households'
initial  relative  deprivation.
In this  paper  we expand  this  earlier  work by addressing  the  role  of
absolute  income  versus  relative  deprivation  incentives  for  internal  and
international  migration  in LDC  households,  taking  into  account  continuities
across  some  labor  markets  and  discontinuities  across  others. The  rationale
for  the  analysis  is  threefold. First,  there  are fairly  strong  reasons  to
expec'.  that  the  role  of relative  deprivation  will  differ  between  international
migration  and  migration  within  a country,  as we explain  below. Second,  sharp
discontinuities  in  the  returns  to  human  capital  between  home-  and  host-country
labor  markets  may  affect  the  ability  of households  that  differ  in their  human
capital  endowments  to  achieve  gains  in their  income  positions  through-2-
international  migration. Third,  a relative  deprivation  approach  to migration
has important  implications  for  development  policy. For  example,  the  effects
of rural  development  policies  on rural  out-migration,  as predicted  by an
expected  income  model,  may be precisely  opposite  to those  predicted  by a
relative  deprivation  model.
In  Section  I  of the  paper  we outline  the  absolute  income  and relative
deprivation  models  of migration  and  present  an illustration  of their  divergent
policy  implications.  We also  consider  the  likely  case in  which  the  decision
to  migrate  and the  choice  of migrant  destination  arc influenced  by both
absolute  income  and  relative  deprivation  objectives. In this  case,  income
remittances  from  household  members  who  migrate  have  a dual impact  on the
household's  well-being:  first,  by contributing  to its  absolute  income;  second,
by improving  its  income  position  relative  to that  of other  village
households. An attempt  is  made to identify  distinct  empirical  implications  of
these  two  motives  for  migrating. In Section  II,  a migration  decision  model is
estimated  and  is  used to  explore  absolute  and  relative  income  motives  for
internal  and international  migration  in a sample  of rural  Mexican  households,
as well  as the  extent  to  which  the  degree  of discontinuity  in labor  markets
shapes  the  choice  of  migrant  destination.
I.  ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  INCOME  HYPOTHESES  OF MIGRATION
Empirical  economic  studies  of  migration  are  based  on the  general
assumption  that individuals  migrate  to  maximize  expected  utility  EU,  which is
typically  defined  on income  Y at the  end  of the  relevant  time  period:-3-
EU  =  EU(Y),  (1)
where U'(Y)  >  9.  Let Yi denote income associated with migration, net of any
implied  moving  costs,  and let  Y0  denote  income  in the  absence  of migration.
The  absolute  income  hypothesis  then  states  simply  that  a person  will  migrate
if EU(Y 1) >  EU(YO). That  is,  an individual's  labor  is allocated  to the  labor
market  associated  with  the  highest  level  of expected  utility. A clearer
pZcture  of the  economic  determinants  of  migration  can  be gained  when expected
utility  is replaced  by its  Taylor-series  approximation  around  the  expected
income  EY (David  1974):
EU(Y)  = U(EY)  +  0.5U"(EY)s',  (2)
where  s2 is the  variance  of income  Y and U"(EY)  is the  second  derivative  of
utility  evaluated  at expected  income  EY.  If  decision-makers  are risk  neutral
- that  is,  if  U"(EY)  is  zero  - equation  (2)  reduces  to the  expected  income
hypothesis  (see,  for  example,  Todaro  1969),  which  states  that labor  will be
allocated  to the  destination  that  maximizes  expected  income. In  contrast,  if
the migration decision-maker is risk averse - that is, U"(EY)  <  0 - then
migration  decisions  are  influenced  by both  the  mean and  the  variability  of
income  associated  with  alternative  locations,  as well  as by the  decision-
maker's  aversion  to risk.  In the  case  of risk  aversion,  the  absolute  income
model  predicts  that  an individual  will  migrate  if the  corresponding  expected
income  gain  outweighs  any  increase  in income  risk that  may be associated  with
migration  (Stark  and  Levhari  1982).1 Several  studies  provide  empirical-4-
support  fo:  an absolute  income  motive  for  migration,  with regard  to both
expected  income  (Y.  1977;  Todaro  1980)  and  risk (Lucas  and Stark  1985;  Taylor
1986;  Rosenzweig  and  Stark  1989).
A.  A RELATIVE  DEPRIVATION  HYPOTHESIS
In earlier  papers  (Stark  1984;  Stark  and  Taylor  1989)  it  was
hypothesized  that  household  members  undertalce  migration  not  necessarily  to
increase  the  }.ousehold's  absolute  income  but  rather  to improve  the  household's
position  (in  terms  of relative  deprivation)  with respect  to  a specific
reference  group. The  case  studied  in those  papers  is  of individuals  who
engage  in  migration  to improve  the  income  position  of their  households
relative  to that  of all  ather  households  in the  village.
Consider  two  villages  of households  whose incomes  are as follows:
A1 =  (20,30,40,50,60)  and  A2 =  (20,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,60).  These  two income
distributions  share  the  same  a.erage  income  (40),  and  both cover  the same
income  range  (20,60). However,  whereas  the  five  household  incomes  in  A1 are
uniformly  distributed  over this  range,  seven  of the  nine incomes  in  A2 are
concentrated  around  the  mean.
Suppose  that  by reallocating  some  of its  labor  to  migration  the
household  earning  the  average  income  in  each  village  can  enjoy  a 20 percent
(8-unit)  increase  in  absolute  income. For the  household  in  A2, this  absolute
income  gain  translates  into  a relative  income  gain of three  ranks,  enabling
that  household  to  move to  within  one  rank  of the  top  of its  village  income
distribution.  In contrast,  the  same  absolute  income  gain  leaves  the  A1
household's  rank  unchanged. Assume  that  the  nature  of the  reallocation  is5
such  that  when  a ho sehold  member  is  ass.gned  to  a different  sector,  the
household  together  with that  member  continue  to  consider  Ai as the  relevant
reference  distribution.  (This  assumption  it  discussed  below  in the  context  of
international  and internal  migration.) If  household  utility  is  a function  not
only  of absolute  income  but  also  of ranking  in relation  to other  households  in
the  village,  then  we  would  intuitively  expect  that  the  average  household  in A2
will have  a stronger  motivetion  to participate  in  migration  than  the  average
household  in  A1. That is,  a given  absolute  income  gain  associated  with an
improvement  in  rank is  worth  more than  an identical  income  gain  without  an
improvement  in rank.
Consider  now the  poorest  households  in  A1 and in  A2. Suppose  tha-
each  of these  households  can  reap  a 60 percent  (12-unit)  gain from  migration
by one of its  members. This  gain  will not  cause  a rank  change  for the
household  in  A2, but  the  household  in  A1 could  escape  from the  very bottom  of
its  village's  income  distribution  through  migration. Other  things  being
equal,  a  given  absolute  income  gain  may be considered  more valuable  in the
latter  situation  than in  the  former.
The  two  examples  above  have in common  a correlation  between  rank
within  an income  distribution  and  absolute  income. However,  we can  easily
consider  rank  gains  that  are  not  associated  with income  gains,  or rank  losses
that  are  not  associated  with income  losses. Consider  two  village  household
income  distributicns  given  by B1 =  (30,35,40,45,50)  and  B2 =  (30,32,34,
47,62). For  the  household  with income  equal  to 35,  relocation  from  B1 to
B2 would  result  in  a rank  gain  that is  not  associated  with  an absolute  income
change. Intuition  alone,  however,  may  not provide  clear-cut  guidance  on-6-
whether  to  expect  this  move to take  place. Even though  the  change  implies  a
higher  rank in  a new  reference  group  having  the same  average  income  (after  35
is  added  to B2, the  average  income  in  B2 is  40), in  a cardinal  sense  the  new
position  may  be perceived  as inferior  (if  judged,  for  example,  by the  distance
from  the  highest-income  household:  62-35  >  50-35). An ambiguity  arises  in
this  case  because  the  simple  rank  measure  is  not sufficiently  sensitive  to all
rank-related  information.  Hence  there  is  a need to  adopt  a more  complete
measure  of income  ranking  and  relative  deprivation. We shall  draw  here on an
axiomatic  foundation  for  an index  of relative  deprivation  reported  in related
papers  (Stark  and  Yitzhaki  1988;  Stark  and  Taylor  1989).
Let  RD'  denote  household  i's  relative  deprivation. Assume  a
continuous  income  distribution.  Each income  unit can  then  be represented  by
an income  range  [x,x+4x],  where  AxO.  Let  F(x)  be the  cumulative
distribution  of income  in  a village. Then l-F(x)  is the  percentage  of
households  whose  income  is  higher  than  x. Hence  l-F(x)  represents  the
percentage  of households  that  have incomes  sufficient  to obtain  the
commodities  represented  by the  income  range  [x,x+Ax]. By hypothesis,  the
feeling  of deprivation  is an increasing  function  of the  percentage  of
households  with incomes  larger  than  x.  Let  g[l-F(x)]  be the  deprivation  from
not  having  [x,x+AxJ,  where  g(O)  =  0 and g'  >  0.  A household  with income  x is
deprived  of all  units  of income  above  x.  Thus,  we can  write the  relative
deprivation  of household  i,  whose  income  is  yi,  as
RDi =  fyi  g[l-F(x)ldx,  (3)
yI-7-
where  yh denotes  the  highest  village  income. To simplify  the  discussion,  we
shall  assume  a simple  form  of g[l-F(x)]  =l-F(x).  Subject  to somi  algebraic
manipulations,  the  expression  on the  right-hand  side  of equation  (3)  can  be
decomposed  into  the  product  of  the  mean  excess  income  of households  richer
than  the  household  with  income  y' and  the  proportion  Af households  in  the
village  that  are  richer  than  the  household  with income  y . (For  these
procedures  and  an analysis  of the  more general  form  g(.-),  see  Stark  and
Yitzhaki  1988.) This interpretation  nicely  captures  the  point  that,  if all
rankings  are left  intact,  any increase  in the  income  of a household  richer
than  household  i  will increase  the  relative  deprivation  of household  i,
whereas  any rank  gain  by household  i (resulting  in  a decline  of the  proportion
of  households  richer  than i)  will  reduce  the  relative  deprivation  of household
i.  Given  this  interpretation,  in  the  example  above  cf household  income
distributions  B1 and  B2, the  ambiguity  associated  with the  relocation  of the
household  with  an income  of 35 is  not  only better  understood  but is  also
resolved  because  the  two  effects  are  duly  weighted  (resulting,  in the  case  of
the  example,  in an increase  of relative  deprivation  from  6.0  to 6.5).
The  relative  deprivation  hypothesis  is that  migration  will  be
observed  if EUR1  EURD0  where  RD 1 is the  relative  deprivation
associated  with  migration  and  RDO is the  relative  deprivation  in the  absenc3
of  migration. Thus  individuals  or households  below  the  upper  end  of the
inconie  distribution  may decide  to engage  in  migrction  on the  assumption  that
they  will  thereby  succeed  in improving  their  positions  in  the  village  by
securing  an income  higher  than  their  initial  income.
To illustrate  some  of the  new policy  implications  of the relative-8-
deprivation  approach  to  migration,  we consider  an extreme  example. In a
country  consisting  of  a village  and  a town,  the income  of every  village
household  is 100;  in  the  town,  it is  200.  As the  result  of a certain
development  policy,  tile  income  of half  the  village  households  rises  to 150.
What  are  the likely  migration  implications?  In  a world  motivated  solely  by
income  differentials,  the incentives  for  village-to-town  migration  will  have
declined  unequivocally:  the  propensity  to  migrate  of those  earning  150  has
declined,  whereas  that  of those  earniing  100  remains  as before. In  a world
motivated  solely  by relative  deprivation,  the  prediction  is  exactly  the
opposite. If the  village  is the  relevant  reference  group  for  village
households,  before  the  change  no household  had  any inducement  to  migrate,
since  the  relative  deprivation  of each  and  every  household  was  nil.  After  the
change,  however,  half  of the  village  households  - those  which  now experience
relative  deprivation  (at  the  level  of 25 units  of income)  - will have  an
incentive  to migrate,  whereas  the incentive  to  migrate  of tha  others  (whose
income  is 150)  will  retnain  at zero.
When  a household's  utility  is  a function  of  both absolute  income  and
relative  deprivation  arising  from  intra-group  income  comparisons,  the  effect
of a policy  change  on  the propensity  to  migrate  from  the  village  cannot  be
pre-signed  because  there  are conflicting  effects:  the  lower  inducement  to
migrate  of the  househoids  whose  absolute  incomes  rise  has to be  weighed
against  the  new inducement  to  migrate  on the  part  of  households  whose  relative
incomes  fall. The  received  theory,  however,  will _dmit  only the  former
inducement  and is  completely  blind  to the  latter. The  relative  deprivation
theory  of  migration  and  the  received  theory  of migration  based  on absolute-9-
income  differencials  generate  conflicting  predictions.
Suppose  that  a development  agency  is  ntt indifferent  to the  migration
implications  of its  policies  and  wishes  to induce  less  migration,  more
migration,  or keep  migration  at its  existing  level. If the  relative
deprivation  theory  of  migration  obtains,  a new  policy  instrument  is
identified,  and  the  policy  mix will  thereby  change. For  example,  in  an effort
to stem  rural-to-urban  migration,  equalization  of the  rural  income
distribution  could  be  combined  with,  reinforced  by, or substituted  for  the
narrowing  of town-village  income  differentials.
B.  AN INTEGRATED  APPROACH
In real  life  it is likely  that  migration  decisions  are influenced  by
both  absolute  and  relative  income  cons,derations.  In thi, case  utility  is  of
the form
U - U(Y,  RD),.  (4)
where  au/aY >  0 and WU/MRD  <  0.  The  net  utility  gain from  migration  is given
by tne  differential
a1=  U(Y1 ,  RD 1)  - U(YO,  RDO).  (5)
This  can  be expressed  as a function  of YO,  RDO,  and the  net  household  income
gain  from  migration  (which  we shall  denote  W) by replacing  RD 1 with its
Taylor-series  approximation  around  YO:- 10  -
A1 =  UtY 0 +  W, RD  + RD;W]  - UN,  RDO]  (6)
=  0(Yo,  RDO,  W),
where  RDI is  the  change  in  relative  deprivation  brought  about  by a small 0
change  in income  at income  level  Y0.
Assume  for  a moment  that  the  relative  deprivation  function  is staole
in the  face  of migration  by one or  more household  members  - that  is,  the
household  including  its  migrants  continues  to  view the  village  as its  relevant
reference  group. In this  case,  any  variable  that  enhances  the  net returns  W
from  migration  can increase  the  household's  incentive  to participate  in
migration  in two  ways:  first,  by increasing  absolute  income  Y1 = Y0 +  W;
second,  by decreasing  relative  deprivation,  since  by construction  RDO  <  0.
On the  basis  of this  consideration,  the  effect  of a  household's  income  and
relative  deprivation  levels  in  the  absence  of migration  on its  propensity  to
participate  in migration  is generally  predictable. At low  levels  of income,
incentives  to engage  in  pozentially  income-enhancing  migration  may be
strong. On the  absolute  income  side,  low  village  incomes  presumably  imply
large  income  disparities  between  migration  work and  village  work,  and  hence
large  potential  net  gains  from  migration. Low  village  incomes  are  also
associated  with  high  degrees  of relative  deprivation  as defined  in  equation
(3),  and  hence  the  incentive  to  reduce  relative  deprivation  through  migration
may  also  be large  for  low-income  households. Thus,  other  things  being  equal,
both  the  absolute  and relative  income  hypotheses  would  predict  a greater
desire  to  engage  in  migration  among  households  or individuals  at the  lower  end- 11  -
of the  village  income  spectrum.
However,  in  the  absence  of smoothly  functioning  credit  markets  that
give  explicit  preference  to  the  poor  - a condition  characteristic  of village
economies  in  LDCs  - households  or individuals  at very low levels  of absolute
income  may  be unable  to  engage  in  migration  if  migration  is  costly  and  the
initial  risks  associated  with it  are  high. 2 In  addition,  at incomes  very  near
or below  subsistence,  relative  income  considerations  are  not likely  to matter
as  much  as concerns  for  mere survival. Thus,  we would  expect  a small  increase
in income  (and  a small  decrease  in  relative  deprivation)  to  have a positive
effect  on  migration  from  households  at the  very bottom  of the  village  income
distribution  - owing,  first,  to  a loosening  of capital  constraints  on
migration  and, second,  to the  increasing  importance  of relative  deprivation
considerations  ill  these  households'  labor  allocations. At higher  income
levels,  in  contrast,  both  the  relative  and  absolute  income  hypotheses  predict
that  increases  in  income  will  reduce  the  likelihood  that  households  or
individuals  will engage  in  migration. It is therefore  impossible  on purely
theoretical  grounds  to  separate  the  effect  of absolute  income  incentives  from
the  effect  of relative  income  incentives  for  migration,  since,  when credit
markets  are  highly  imperfect,  absolute  and  relative  income  effects  of changes
in  village  incomes  tend  to  move in tandem. Note that  migration  studies  that
ignore  relative  income  effects  may place  undue  significance  on absolute  income
motives  for  migration.- 12  -
C.  REFERENCE  GROUP  SUBSTITUTION, LABOR  MABRKET  DISCONTINUITIES,
AND  DESTINATION  CHOICE
In  a relative  deprivation  model  of  migration  there  is  a risk that,
through  a reference  group  substitution  of the  host  community  for  the  village
community,  households  may fail  to  decrease  their  relative  deprivation  - even
if their  relative  incomes  in terms  of the  village  income  distribution
improve. That is,  the  household's  relative  deprivation  function  may  not be
stable  in the  face  of  migration  by one  or  more household  members. The
household's  well-being  is  an increasing  function  of the  well-being  of all its
members,  regardless  of their  location. Migration  may be associated  with  a
rise  in  a  household's  relative  deprivation  if the  host  community  becomes  the
relevant  reference  group  for  either  the  migrant  or, perhaps  less  likely,  the
household  members  who remain  in the  village.
In a recent  study  it  was argued  that international  migration,  to  an
entirely  different  social  and  cultural  milieu,  can  carry  with it built-in
protection  against  such  reference  group  substitution  and  can  ensure  that  the
original  reference  group  continues  to  be the  relevant  one  for  the  migrant  and
his  or her  household  (Stark  and  Taylor  1989). By locating  themselves  in  a
host community  distinct  from  their  own,  migrants  are less  likely  to orient
themselves  to the  host community  than  if they  were to locate  themselves  in  a
"neighboring"  host  community. For  a comparison  with the  host  community  to
occur,  some  "minimal  similarity"  between  the  migrant  and that  community  must
be perceived. This becomes  more  likely  when  direct  social  interaction  or
sustained  social  relations  persist. In some  cases,  the  host  community  may  be
intentionally  selected  to  ensure  estrangement,  detachment,  and social- 13 -
distance. Migrants  may  wish to  guard  against  becoming  oriented  to the  host
community  for  fear  that  the  secondary  negative  effects  of a changing  reference
group  might  outweigh  the  primary  positive  effect  of improving  their  position
in  relation  to the  original  reference  group. Thus international  migration  can
enable  households  to exploit  cultural  and social  discontinuity  across
international  frontiers,  capture  this  discontinuity,  and transform
international  dissimilarities  into  a source  of advantage. This consideration
applies  in particular  to repetitive  or temporary  migration  rather  than  to
permanent,  once-and-for-all  migration;  in  the  recent  study  cited,  migration
was  by and  large  of the  former  type. 3
Indeed,  households  may behave  strategically  to preempt  reference
group  substitution  associated  with  migration  of  a long  duration  by given  (that
is,  the  same)  household  members. Household  members  might  be shuffled  between
destination  and  home,  replacing  each other  as  migrants. Note  that,  by
constructioii,  the  analysis  in the  present  paper  is of a short-run  nature.
Reference  group  association  and  household  attachment  could  become  endogenous
processes  conditional  on relative  performance  in a set  of reference  groups.
Households  and  individuals  may substitute  one  reference  group  for  another  to
suppress  the  dissatisfaction  arising  from  a high level  of a group-specific
relative  deprivation. Such  a substitution  typically  involves  locational  and
mental  migration  and is bound  to be time  consuming.
In  contrast  with international  migration,  migration  within  a country
is  more likely  to  generate  alienation  and increased  relative  deprivation
through  a smooth  reference  group  substitution,  particularly  when  the country
is socially  and  culturally  homogeneous. These  considerations  suggest  that  the- 14  -
role  of relative  deprivation  in internal  migration  may be quite  different  from
the  role  of relative  deprivation  in international  migration,  owing  to social
and  cultural  discontinuities  across  international  borders.
Indeed,  the  full logic  of this  argument  could  lead  to a puzzling
neutrality  result. Consider  a household  that  experiences  intra-village
relative  deprivation  while,  at the  same  time,  facing  a positive  urban-to-rural
income  differential  for  one  of its  members. Should  that  household  member
engage  in rural-to-urban  migration,  his increased  alienation  arising  from  a
reference  group  substitution  could  offset  any  absolute  income  gain.  The
village  household  may recognize  that  the  migrant  member  would  need  to "tax"
his  higher  urban  income  to compensate  for  a rising  relative  deprivation,
thereby  leaving  little  for  urban-to-rural  remittances. In this  case,  a
relatively  deprived  household  would  not engage  in internal  migration  via  one
of its  members,  even  though  the  associated  expected  absolute  income
differential  is positive. Consequently,  neither  the  estimated  coefficient  for
relative  deprivation  nor  that  for  absolute  income  may appear  significant  in  an
econometric  migration  model.
Discontinuities  in  labor  markets  across  international  frontiers  may,
however,  temper  the  role  of relative  deprivation  in  migration  decisions.
Paramount  among  these  are sharp  differences  in the  return:  to human  capital.
Education,  skills,  and  work  experience  in  the  home country  may  enhance  the
returns  to internal  migration. But it is  less clear  to  what degree  these
human  capital  assets  are internationally  transferable.  When international
migration  takes  the  form  of illegal  entry  into  the  host country,  as is
frequently  the  case  with  migration  from  rural  Mexico  to the  tnited  States,  the- 15  °
returns  to  human  capital  in  host-country  labor  markets  may be  minimal  (Taylor
1987).
Empirical  work is therefore  needed  to pursue  further  an analysis  of
explanations  for internal  and international  migration  motivated  by absolute
versus  relative  income  considerations.  By including  both  absolute  income  and
relative  deprivation  variables  in a single  household  model  of internal  and
international  migration  decisions,  it is possible  to isolate  empirically  the
differential  influence  of relative  deprivation  on these  two types  of
migration,  provided  that  not  all  migration  decision  units  are  drawn  from  the
same  reference  group. Estimated  absolute  household  income  if a household
member  does  not  migrate  can  be used to control  for  the  effects  of both  the
motivations  to  migrate  and the  capital  constraints  associated  with  absolute
income  in  the  migration  equation. Controlling  for  the  initial  absolute  income
of  households  and for  their  human  capital,  the integrated  model  would  predict
that  the  initial  relative  deprivation  of households  will  have  a positive
'influence  on the  propensity  to send  migrants  to destinations  where  the
potential  returns  to migration  are large  enough  to alter  significantly  the
relative  income  positions  in the  village,  and  where  the  risk  of reference
group  substitution  is  small.
II.  EVIDENCE  FROM  MEXICO
A.  DATA
Data from  a survey  of rural  Mexican  households  were  used to test  for
the  effects  of absolute  income  and relative  deprivation  on migration  both  to
Mexican  destinations  and to the  United  States. The  sample  consists  of 61-16  -
randomly  selected  households  surveyed  in the  Phtzcuaro  region  of the  state  of
Michoacan,  Mexico,  during  the  winter  of 1983.  From  these  households  we
obtained  data on 423  adults  who  were 13  years  of age  or older. Data  were
collected  for  a set  of characteristics  - of both  the individuals  themselves
and  their  households  - that  are likely  to influence  the  returns  to  households
from  migration  versus  nonmigration  work by household  members. Data  were  also
collected  on the  allocation  of each individual's  labor  to  migration  and
nonmigration  &ctivities  and on each  individual's  income  contribution  to the
household  during  1982. The latter  include,  for  nonmigrants,  contributions  of
income  from  household  farm  production  (farming,  handicrafts,  fishing,
livestock,  commerce,  and  the  like),  village  wage  work,  and rental  income. 4
Income  contributions  in the  form  of remittances  from  household  members  who
migrated,  either  within  Mexico  or to the  United  States,  are  all  net  of reverse
(household-to-migrant)  flows  and  of direct  migration  costs. A "migrant"  is
defined  as an individual  who left  the  village  at any  time  during  1982  for  the
purpose  of working. The  shortest  term  of  migration  in the  sample  was
approximately  three  weeks.  Nonmigrants  include  individuals  who remained  in
the  village  throughout  the  year,  as well  as a small  group  of secondary  and
post-secondary  students  who studied  outside  the  village  but  did  not
participate  in  migrant  labor  activities. (The  empirical  results  are  not
significantly  altered  if students  are excluded  entirely  from  the  sample.)
Selected  characteristics  of the  households  of nonmigrants,  internal
migrants,  and Mexico-to-U.S.  migrants,  together  with individual
characteristics  of the  migrant  and  nonmigrant  subsamples,  are  summarized  in
Table  1.  (In  no case in the  sample  was a person  both  an internal  and  a- 17  -
Mexico-to-U.S.  migranit  in 1982.) Distinct  patterns  characterize  the
households  of the  three  labor  groups. Families  of nonmigrants,  on average,
are relatively  small,  with 7.8  adult  members  (13  years  or older)  compared  with
8.5  and  9.1,  respectively,  for  internal  migrant  and  Mexico-to-U.S.  migrant
families. Nonmiprant  households  have less  land  and  fewer  physical  assets
overall  than  do migrant  households. They  are  likely  to have internal
migration  networks,  or family  contacts  at internal  migrant  destinations,  but
are  far less  likely  to  have  networks  to the  U.S.  Fewer  than  half  of the
nonmigrants  are  male (43  percent). On average,  nonmigrants  are somewhat  older
than  migrants  (33  years,  compared  with  28-29  years  for  the  two  migrant
groups),  have little  schooling  (3.9  years),  and  have little  past  internal  and
Mexico-to-U.S.  migration  experience  (0.32  years  and  0.76  years,  respectively).
Internal  migrants  are  distinguished  from the  other  two  labor  groups
by their  high  schooling  levels  (6.5  years)  and their  past  internal  migration
experience  (4.8  years). Eighty  percent  of all internal  migrants  come  from
households  with family  contacts  at internal  migrant  destinations.
Overwhelmingly,  internal  migrants  from  the  households  in this  sample  migrate
to  Mexico  City.  The  main  exceptions  are some  villagers  with secondary  or
post-secondary  schooling  who  migrate  into  government  teaching  jobs  scattered
around  rural  Mexico. Mexico-to-U.S.  migrants  are predominantly  male (63
percent)  and  uneducated  (4.1  years)  but  have considerable  past  U.S.  migration
experience  (4.9  years). Their  households  are above  average  in terms  of adult
family  size  (9.1),  landholdings  (7.1  hectares),  physical  capital  wealth
($3,500  in 1982  dollars),  and the  probability  of having  family  contacts  in the
United  States  (0.89).- 18  -
More than  a third  of all individuals  in  the sample  were labor
migrants  during  1982.  In  no case,  however,  did  an entire  household  leave  the
village. Thus the  households  covered  by the  sample  remained  as stable  and
meaningful  entities  in their  respective  villages  while  individual  household
members  participated  in labor  migration,  typically  remitting  part  of their
earnings  to the  household. Each  observation  in the  sample  represents  a
separate  allocation  of  household  labor  time. 5
B.  ESTIMATION
A procedure  to test  the relative  deprivation  hypothesis  presented
earlier  in this  paper  requires,  as indicated  by equation  (6),  estimation  of
the effects  on  households'  internal  and  Mexican-to-U.S.  migration  decisions  of
initial  absolute  income,  initial  relative  deprivation,  and  factors  expected  to
influence  the  net  returns  to  households  from  undertaking  migration.
A multinomial  logit  procedure  was used  to estimate  the  probabilities
that  an individual  participated  in internal  migration  or  Mexico-to-U.S.
migration  work during  1982,  versus  the  alternative  of engaging  exclusively  in
activities  other  than  labor  migration.
Let  ad be a vector  of characteristics  of the  household  member  and  his
or her  household  that  are likely  to influence  the  net income  gain to the
household  from  allocating  the  member's  time  to  migrant  destination  d, such
that  this  gain can  be represented  as Wd =  fd  (Xd). Thus the  household's  income
if  the  member  migrates  to  destination  d can  be  written  as Yd =  Y0 + Wd
=  Y0 +  f  d(Xd),  where  Y0 is the  household's  income  in the  absence  of  migration
by the  member. For  d=1 (internal  migration)  and  d=2 (Mexico-to-U.S.- 19-
migration),  the  vector  Xd includes  the  household  member's  sex,  age,  education,
status  as household  head or  not, and  migration  work  experience. These
variables  can  influence  household  members'  earnings  as migrants  in  different
labor  markets  as  well as  migrants'  motivations  to remit  part  of these  earnings
to the  household. The  vector  Xd,  d=1,2  also includes  household  migration
networks  or contacts  with  relatives  at prospective  migrant  destinations,  which
can  reduce  the  costs  and  risks  associated  with labor  migration  (especially
those  of illegal  Mexico-to-U.S.  migration),  and  household  wealth,  which  can
affect  the  household's  willingness  to  participate  in risky  migration
activities  and its  ability  to secure  financing  for  these  activities. The  net
gains  from  migration  are  also  a function  of the  income  household  members  would
contribute  to the  household  as nonmigrants. Thus  Xd also contains  variables
that  affect  the  returns  to the  member's  labor  in the  village. These  include
the  individual  characteristics  mentioned  above  plus  household  adult  labor
available  to  assume  household-farm  duties,  and household  landholdings,  which
may be  an indication  of the  demar  for  labor  on the  household  farm,  especially
where  limited  land  rental  markets  exist,  as in ejido  (land-reform)  areas  of
Mexico. Assuming  that  households  allocate  their  members'  time  so as to
maximize  utility,  the  member  will be observed  as a  migrant  worker  at
destination  d*  with a probability  of
P(d*)  =  Prob[U(Yd*,RDd*)>U(YO,RD)  and
U(Yd*,RDd*)>U(Yd.  pRDd  '  1],
where  d' denotes  the  "migration  route  not  taken."- 20  -
Replacing  U(Yd*,  RDd*)  and  U(Yd.l  RDd.)  by their  Taylor-series
approximations  around  Y0, as in  equation  (6),  we obtain
P(d*)  =  ProblAd*o  >0 and  Ad*,d  ]>0,
where
A  lo  =  U[Y  + Wd*,  RD 0+  RD#Wd*]  - U(YO,  RDo)
and
A  ,  = U(Y0+ Wd  ,aO+  RD  Wd*I  - u[Y 0 + Wd,  W  td
Substituting  fd(Xd)  for  Wd,  dd*,d', the  probability  that  the  member  is
assigned  to  migrant  destination  d* becomes
P(d*)  =  +(Y 0, RDO,  X),
where  X is  a vector  containing  the  variables  in  Xd*  and  Xdt*
Let  Z denote  a lxK  vector  whose  components,  zkt  are  the  explanatory
variables  Y0 o  RDO,  and  X (where  Y0 is the  household's  estimated  income  if the
household  member  does  not  migrate  and  RD  is the  household's  estimated  level
of  relative  deprivation  associated  with this  income). The logit  equations  are
given  by-21  -
2
P(d*)  = exp(ZBd*)/  j  1  +  I  exp(Zd)  (7)
d=l
for  migration  types  d*=1 (internal  migration)  and  d= 2 (Mexico-to-U.S.
migration),  where Bd is  a Kxl  vector  whose  components  bd,k  are the
coefficients  on characteristic  k that  correspond  to  migrant  labor  destination
d.  The  logit  reference  category  is  nonmigration.  The logit  probability  of
2
nonmigration  is P(O)  =  i/[l  +  Z  exp(ZBd)1.
d1l
Instrumental-variable  techniques  were  used to obtain  estimates  of
household  income  in the  absence  of migration  by  a nousehold  member  and  of the
level  of relative  deprivation  associated  with  different  income  levels. These
techniques  are  described  in  the  Appendix. The  household  sample  was drawn  from
two  villages. Thus,  two similar  absolute  incomes  do not  necessarily  imply
similar  levels  of relative  deprivation,  and  absolute  income  and relative
deprivation  can  be treated  as independent. 6 These  absolute  income  and
relative  deprivation  variables,  together  with  a  quadratic  transformation  of
each,  are the  basis  for  testing  the  relative  and  absolute  income  hypotheses
empirically.  The  quadratic  variables  are  included  in the  empirical  analysis
to capture  potential  nonlinearities  created  by  credit  constraints  (in  the  case
of absolute  income)  and subsistence  concerns  (in  the  case  of relative
deprivation),  as discussed  previously. Definitions  of the  variables  used in
the  logit  analysis  appear  in  Table  2.
Strong  dissimilarities  between  labor  markets  imply  substantial
differences  in  the  returns  to human  capital  for  migrant  workers. Although
migration  to a foreign  labor  market  tends  to  minimize  the  added  relative
deprivation  to which  the  household  is exposed,  there  is evidence  that  returns- 21  -
2
P(d*)  =  exp(ZBd*)/ i1  +  I  exp(ZBd)  (7)
d  ~~d=
for  migration  types  d*=l (internal  migration)  and  d 2  (Mexico-to-U.S.
migration),  where  Bd is  a Kxl  vector  whose  components  bd,k  are the
coefficients  on characteristic  k that  correspond  to migrant  labor  destination
d.  The logit  reference  category  is nonmigration.  The logit  probability  of
2
nonmigration  is  P(O)  =  1/[1  +  Z  exp(Z8d)I.
d=l
Instrumental-variable  techniques  were  used to obtain  estimates  of
household  income  in  the  absence  of  migr&tion  by a household  member  and  of the
level  of relative  deprivation  associated  with  different  income  levels. These
techniques  are  described  in the  Appendix. The  household  sample  was  drawn  from
two  villages. Thus,  two  similar  absolute  incomes  do not  necessarily  imply
similar  levels  of relative  deprivation,  and  absolute  income  and  relative
deprivation  can  be treated  as independent.6  These  absolute  income  and
relative  deprivation  variables,  together  with  a quadratic  transformation  of
each,  are  the  basis  for testing  the  relative  and  absolute  income  hypotheses
empirically.  The quadratic  variables  are  included  in the  empirical  analysis
to capture  potential  nonlinearities  created  by credit  constraints  (in  the case
of absolute  income)  and subsistence  concerns  (in  the  case  of relative
deprivation),  as discussed  previously.  Definitions  of the  variables  used in
the  logit  analysis  appear  in  Table  2.
Strong  dissimilarities  between  labor  markets  imply  substantial
differences  in the  returns  to  human  capital  for  migrant  workers. Although
migration  to a foreign  labor  market  tends  to  minimize  the  added  relative
deprivation  to  which  the  household  is  exposed,  there  is evidence  that returns- 23  -
that  he or she  did  not  participate  in any  form  of labor  migration.
When interpreting  these  results,  note that  an insignificant
coefficient  with respect  to  a specific  migration  category  does  not imply  that
the  corresponding  variable  does  not  affect  the  probability  that  an individual
will  be observed  in that  category. By equation  (7),  each probability  depends
on  all  the  coefficients  in the  table. A variable  that  has  a significant
effect  on one  migration  probability  has  at least  an indirect  effect  on the
other  probabilities,  since  by  construction  the  probabilities  of the  three
lestination  choices  must sum  to  unity.
In Section  I  we argued  that  absolute  income  may have  a positive
effect  on migration  from  poor  village  households  when  migration  is costly,
credit  markets  are imperfect,  and  households  therefore  must  self-finance
migration  costs. Our  empirical  findings  confirm  this  expectation. The logit
estimation  yields  a positive  coefficient  on absolute  income  and  a  negative
coefficient  on absolute  income-squared  for  Mexico-to-U.S.  migration,  both
significant  at below  the  0.10  level. U.S.  migration  costs  for  the  houlseholds
in  our  sample  include  the  costs  of  hiring  coyotes,  or smugglers,  to assist
with  a risky,  illegal  border  crossing. These  costs  averaged  US$350  per
migrant  in  1982,  representing  a large  "sunk-cost"  relative  to average  village
incomes. By comparison,  internal  migration  entails  low  costs  and  little
risk. The  negative  coefficient  on income-squared  indicates  that  the
probability  of  Mexico-to-U.S.  migration  declines  at the  highest  income  levels.
Where  all  other  variables  in Table  3 and  also the  effect  of absolute
income  on international  migration  are  controlled  for,  income  does  not  have  a
significant  direct  effect  on internal  migration. It  does,  however,  have  a- 24 -
negative  indirect  effect  on internal  migration  through  its  positive  effect  on
international  migration.
Like  absolute  income,  relative  deprivation  (RD  in  Table  3)  has a
significant  impact  on migration  to  U.S.  destinations  but  does  not have  a
significant  (direct)  effect  on internal  migration. With  everything  else in
the  logit  equation  held  constant,  relatively  deprived  households  are  more
likely  to participate  in  Mexico-to-U.S.  migration  than  are less  relatively
deprived  households. The  coefficient  on RD of 0.57  for  Mexico-to-U.S.
migration  is significant  at below  the  0.05  level,  indicating  an important  role
for  relative  income  motives  in  Mexico-to-U.S.  migration.
The influence  of relative  deprivation  on international  migration  is
not  the  same  at all  points  in  the  village  income  spectrum. Relative  income
motives  for  Mexico-to-U.S.  migration  are lower  in the  must  relatively  deprived
households.  The  negative  coefficient  on the  square  of relative  deprivation
(RDSQ)  is significant  at the  0.05  level  for  Mexico-to-U.S.  migration. This
result  is  consistent  with  the  hypothesis,  put forward  in Section  I, that
subsistence  concerns  tend  to dampen  relative  income  considerations  in  the
poorest  village  households. 7
The findings  suggest  that  the  income  neutrality  result  of relative
deprivation  theory,  posited  in Section  I.C  above,  may  hold in the  case  of
internal  migration  for  the  households  in this  sample. If the  perceived  risk
of a reference  group  substitution  through  internal  migration  is  high,  then
internal  migration  ceases  to  be an effective  means  for  achieving  relative
deprivation  gains  for  households  in the  village. If  the  household  perceives
that  the  cost  of reducing  the  migrant's  sense  of relative  deprivation  in the- 25 -
city  is  high,  then  internal  migration  may also  cease  to be viewed  as an
effective  device  for  viilage  households  to achieve  absolute  income  gains,  even
if  there  is a positive  urban-rural  income  differential. This interesting
possibility  is ruled  out  by conventional,  absolute-income  models  of migration.
The  remaining  variables  in the  decision  model  are included  for  their
hypothesized  influence  on the  returns  to migration  versus  nonmigration
activities  and  on the  motivation  of household  members  to contribute  all  or
part  of their  earnings  to  their  respective  households. We would  expect
migrating  household  members  to  be those  whose  attributes  are  most likely  to be
associated  with  high  differentials  in  returns  to the  household  from  migration
versus  nonmigration  activities. In  addition,  certain  household
characteristics  are  likely  to  have an important  effect  on both the  probability
of migration  and the  choice  of  migrant  destination.
The logit  analysis  reveals  striking  differences  between  migrants  and
nonmigrants  as  well  as between  the  two  groups  of migrants. On average,
migrants  tend  to be  male,  20-30  years  of age,  not  heads  of households,  and to
possess  past  migration  experience. However,  two  of these  variables  affect  the
migration  categories  in  very  different  ways.  Although  males  are significantly
more likely  than  females  to participate  in  Mexico-to-U.S.  migration,  sex  plays
an insignificant  role  in  explaining  internal  migration. Household  heads,  in
contrast,  are  very  unlikely  to engage  in international  migration  but  are  no
less  likely  to  be internal  migrants  than  are  those  who  are  not  heads  of
households.  The  latter  result  no doubt  reflects  differences  in opportunity
costs  between  internal  and international  migration  for  household  heads. For
heads  of  households,  administrative  responsibilities  on the  family  farm  and- 26  -
other  obligations  in  the  village  generally  preclude  migration  to  the United
States,  which  typically  entails  a large  commitment  of both  time  and  capital.
Household  members'  schooling  (ED)  has  a significant  positive  effect  on the
probability  of internal  migration  but is  negatively  related  to Mexico-to-U.S.
migration. Not surprisingly,  better-educated  villagers  are  much more likely
to  migrate  to destinations  in  Mexico,  where  returns  to schooling  are likely  to
be high,  than  to low-skill  undocumented  immigrant  labor  markets  in  the  United
States.
Household  members'  experience  as migrants  in the  U.S.  and  experience
as migrants  in  Mexico  have  a positive  association  with the  probability  of
migration  to both  destinations.  However,  the  estimated  coefficient  on U.S.
migration  experience  in  the  U.S.  migration  equation  (0.487,  significant  at
below  the  0.05  level)  is  more than  three  times  the  coefficient  on U.S.
experience  in  the  Mexico  migration  equation  (0.141,  significant  at the  0.10
level). Similarly,  although  experience  as an internal  migrant  is  positively
related  to  both  types  of migration,  it  has  a larger  and  more significant
effect  on internal  migration  than  on international  migration. On the  one
hand,  these  findings  suggest  that  migration  experience  has  a general  positive
effect  on  migration  propensities  and that  some  migration  work experience  may
be transferable  across  migrant  destinations.  On the  other  hand,  they  indicate
that  destination-specific  migration  experience  plays  a powerful  role  in
shaping  migration  decisions. These  general  and  destination-specific  migration
experience  effects  are  analogous  to the  differential  effects  of general
training  and  firm-specific  training  in employment  and  earnings  studies.
Several  other  variables  in Table  3 stand  out  as significantly- 27  -
influencing  migration  decisions. Mexico-to-U.S.  migrants  tend to originate
from  households  with other  adult  members  in the  village  (ADULTS  in the  table)
who can  assume  the  household  farm  duties  of those  who  migrate. In addition,
households  with kinship  networks  in  place  in the  United  States  (USNET)  are
significantly  more likely  to send  additional  members  to the  United  States.
The  particularly  large  and significant  coefficient  on  USNET  for the  Mexico-to-
U.S.  migration  category  reflects  the  important  role that  kinship  contacts  play
in international  migration  where  risks  are  highest,  labor  market  information
is  most costly  and scarce,  and  the  penalty  for  failure  (that  is,  lost  time  and
capital)  is  most severe.  Internal  migration  networks  (MEXNET),  in contrast,  do
not significantly  affect  internal  migration. This  reflects  the  relative  ease
with  which  individuals  in  this  sample  can  migrate  and  re-migrate  internally
(that  is,  take  corrective  action  in  case  of a failure).
III.  CONCLUSIONS
The findings  from  Mexico  reported  in this  paper  provide  evidence
that,  if  absolute  income  is controlled  for,  relatively  deprived  households  are
more likely  to engage  in international  migration  than  are households  more
favorably  situated  in  their  village's  income  distribution.  In contrast,  the
findings  suggest  an interesting  `income  neutrality"  result,  unique  to relative
deprivation  theory,  in the  case  of internal  migration. The perceived  risk  of
a reference  group  substitution  through  internal  migration  is likely  to be
high.  In this  case,  rural-to-urban  migration  may cease  to be an effective
vehicle  for  achieving  either  relative  or absolute  income  gains  for  village- 28 -
households. This  possibility  is  ruled  out  by conventional,  absolute  income
models  of  migration. The  empirical  finding  that  both  relative  deprivation  and
absolute  income  are significant  in  explaining  international  migration  but  have
no significant  (direct)  effects  on internal  migration  from  the  households  in
our sample  is  consistent  with this  "income  neutrality"  hypothesis. The
results  for  Mexico-to-U.S.  migration  support  the  relative  deprivation
hypothesis  in the  case  where  a reference  group  substitution  is less  likely.
Choice  of  migrant  destination  .is  also influenced  by the  differential
returns  to human  capital  in internal  and  foreign  labor  markets. Our
econometric  results  suggest  that,  independent  of relative  deprivation
considerations,  households  wisely  pair their  members  with the  labor  markets  in
which  the  returns  to their  human  capital  are likely  to be greatest.
This  analysis  leads  to several  new policy  implications.  Contrary  to
the  assumption  that  all types  of migration  can  be attributed  to the  same
explanatory  variables,  our results  suggest  that  (at  least  in the  context
studied)  a specific  type  of migration  constitutes  a response  to  a specific
configuration  of variables. Thus a  distribution-neutral  development  policy
that  shifts  a village  income  distribution  to the  right  would  reduce  the
incentive  to engage  in internal  migratici  for  all  but  the richest  households
(that  is,  in the  present  case,  by relieving  credit  constraints  on
international  migration). Conversely  a distribution-biased  policy  leading  to
a more  equal  income  distribution  (for  example,  provision  of stronger  support
for  the  poorest  households)  could  tip  a  migration  balance  from  international
migration  to internal  migration.
The  possibility  that  different  variables  may  be the  cause  of- 29  -
different  types  of  migration  could  Lead  to the  paradoxical  result  that
interference  - say#  to stem  migration  - will  result  in its  rise. Raising  the
incomes  of highly  relatively  deprived  households  in a poor  village  may  reduce
these  households'  relative  deprivation  incentive  to engage  in international
migration  but, in the  presence  of imperfect  credit  markets,  may  also  unleash
their  hitherto  constrained  propensity  to engage  in such  migration.
Finally,  if the  disutility  from  relative  deprivation  and the
migration  response  to it are  an increasing  function  of own (absolute)  income,
a "relative  deprivation  paradox  of  migration"  may  operate:  economic
development  that  does  not  redress  intra-village  income  inequalities  (that  is.
a  distribution-neutral  rise  in income)  will  be associated  with  more
international  migration.- 30 -
APPBNDIX
Estimation  of equation  (7)  in  the text  requires  measures,  for  each
household  member  j, of the  predicted  household  income  in the  absence  of
migration  by the  household  member  (Y0)  and of the  level  of relative 0
deprivation  associated  with  this  predicted  income  (RDJ). In this  Appendix  we 0
outline  the  method  used  to obtain,  first,  an instrument  (YJ)  for  household 0
income  in  the  absence  of  migration  by person  j  and,  second,  an instrument
(RDJ)  for  relative  deprivation  associated  with this income. 0
Household  Income  without  Migration  by Person  j.
A household's  predicted  income  in  the  absence  of migration  by
household  member  j (Y')  is the  sum  of predicted  income  from  other househol  memb  j  0
sources  (YJ) and the  expected  contributioni  by the  household  member  as a
nonmigrant  (WJ).  Estimates  of household  income  (from  sources  other than 0*
person  j)  were obtained  by regressing  observed  1982  income  from  sources  other
than  person  j on household  assets  at the  start  of 1982.  The  estimated
equation  is
yi-  =  1376.8  + 0.29A  +  821.92TED  - 96.29NADS
(4.94)  (5.59)  (8.87)  (-1,98)
t  558.08USNET  - 397.96MEXNET
(2.81)  (-1.85)  (A.1)
R2 =  0.28
N  = 423,- 31  -
where  A is the  value  of households'  primary  physical  capital  assets  (land  and
animals)  in thousands  of U.S.  dollars;  NADS  and  TED  are  human  capital  assets
(the  number  of  adults  in  the  household  and  the  number  of household  members
with  post-primary  schooling,  respectively);  and  MEXMIG  and  USMIG  denote
migration  capital  (the  number  of household  members  who participated  in
internal  migration  and in  Mexico-to-U.S.  migration,  respectively,  in  the  year
before  1982). Numbers  in parentheses  are  t-statistics.  Migration  capital  is
included  in  equation  (A.1)  for  its  impact  on contributions  to household  income
by family  members  other  than  member  j.
Household  member  j's  predicted  contribution  to household  income  as a
nonmigrant  was  estimated  by regressing  observed  1982  contributions  by
nonmigrants  on a set  of personal  and  household  variables  likely  to influence
earnings  in  the  village  as well as the  willingness  of nonmigrants'  to share
these  earnings  with the  household. Contributions  by nonmigrants  were observed
only  for  individuals  who  did  not  migrate  during  the  year.  An inverse  Mills
ratio  (LAMBDA)  wao included  in  the  equation  for  contributions  by nonmigrants
to adjust  for  potential  sample-selection  bias (Heckman  1979;  Green  1981). It
was obtained  from  a reduced-form  probit  for  nonmigration  by using  the
explanatory  variables  in  equation  (A.1)  and  the  household  and individual
characteristics  variables  in  Table  1.  The  estimated  equation  for
contributions  by  nonmigrants  is
WJ =  -0.63 +  1.87SEX + 0.l1AGE  - 0. 001AGESQ +  2.08HEAD
0  (0.90)  (6.29)  (2.29)  (-2.39)  (3.86)
+  0.21MEXEX  +  O.22USEX  - 1.30LAMBDA
(1.87)  (3.47)  (-2.19)  (A.2)- 32  -
R2 =  0.44
N  = 273,
where  the  numbers  in  parentheses  are  t-statistics.  The  variables  as they
appear  in  equation  (A.2),  with the  exception  of LAMBDA,  are  defined  in  Table
2.  The  instrument  for  household  income  in the  absence  of  migration  is  given
by Ye = Y j  +  W.
Relative  Deprivation  without  Migration  by Person j.
Estimation  of  a household's  relative  deprivation  in the  absence  of
migration  by  person  j (RDj)  is  complicated  by  the  fact  that  relative
deprivation  is  a function  not  only  of the  income  of person  j's  household  but
also  of the  incomes  of  all  other  households  in person  j's  village  (equation
(3)). We constructed  an instrument  for  RDi  by first  estimating  the  income 0
(Y)  of each  household  in the  village  sample  and then  using  this  estimated
income  distribution  to estimate  the  level  of a household's  relative
deprivation  associated  with  nonmigration  by person  j.
Estimates  of total  household  income  (Y)  were obtained  by regressing
observed  1982  total  household  income  on  household  holdings  of income-producing
assets  at the  start  of the  year  and  then  using  the  estimated  equation  to
predict  1982  income  for  each  household  represented  in the sample. The
estimated  income  equation  is- 33  -
LN(Y)  7.17  +  0.13A  +  0.26TED  - 0.07NADS
(27.2) (2.19)  (2.53)  (-1.19)
+  0.59USMIG  - 0.08MEXMIG
(2.26)  (-0.32)  (A.3)
R2 =  0.32
N  =  61.
Variables  are  as defined  for  equation  (A.1). Numbers  in  parentheses  are  t-
statistics.
Using  the  discrete  form  of equation  (3),  we can  easily  calculate
households'  predicted  relative  deprivation  without  migration  by person  j,
from  YJ and the  predicted  total  incomes  (Ys)  of all  other  households  in  the 0
corresponding  village:
R D  [l-F(x)&x&,  tA.4)
0
where  Yh is  the  highest  predicted  total  household  income  in the  viilage  and,
for  a given  income  xi,  Axi  =  x 1 -xi- 34  -
NOTES
1.  Stark  and Levhari  (1982)  suggest  theoretical  conditions  under
which  migration  can  represent  a risk-reducing  strategy  for  rural  households  in
LDCs.  In this  case,  migration  can  be an optimal  strategy  even if expected
income  as a result  of  migration  is  not  greater  than  expected  rural  income.
For  additional  analysis,  see  Katz  and Stark  (1986);  for  empirical  support,  see
Lucas  and  Stark  (1985)  and  Rosenzweig  and Stark  (1989).
2.  Borrowing  against  future  earnings  expected  to arise  from  present
investment  in  human  capifal  is  difficult  even  in developed  countries,  although
the  difficulty  is  eased  somewhat  by the  availability  of physical  (nonhuman
capital)  assets  that  act  as collateral. Such  perfection  of credit  markets,
limited  as it is,  does  not typically  apply  to the  poor in  LDCs.
3.  Note that  there  need  not be a corresponding  relation  between
absence  of remittances  and reference  group  substitution. For  example,
seasonal  migrants  who return  home repeatedly  may  not  need recourse  to
remittances  to have  their  households  of origin  partake  in the  income  earned  at
the  destination  of  migration. Conversely,  migrants  who  do remit  may do so
even  though  their  village  of origin  does  not  constitute  (part  of)  their
reference  group,  as is the  case  when remittance  flows  are part  of  mutually
beneficial,  risk-sharing,  implicit  contractual  arrangements. See  Stark  and
Lucas  (1988).
4.  Income  contributions  from  household  farm  work  were imputed  on the
basis  of the  number  of days  worked  on the  household  farm,  valued  at the
prevailing  agricultural  wage in  the  village  (this  wage  was substantially  below- 35  -
the  minimum  agricultural  wage in  Mexico). Contributions  by the  owner  (or  de
facto  owner  in the  case  of ejidos,  or reform-sector  lands)  of the  household
farm  also  include  farm  profits. These  were calculated  as the  difference
between  the  gross  value  of farm  output,  evaluated  at the  average  farm-gate
sales  price  in the  case  of subsistence  farming,  and  all  direct  costs  plus
iutvisible  costs. Direct  costs  include  the  cost  of all  material  inputs,  hired
physical  capital  inputs  (mechanical  services,  animal  services,  land),  and
hired  labor  inputs. Invisible  costs  include  the  cost  of imputed  wages  of
unpaid  family  labor. Contributions  also include  rental  income  (land  rents  and
payments  received  for  capital  services)  and income  from  livestock  (the  net
additions  to animal  stocks  as well  as sales  of animals  and animal  products)
received  by owners  of these  capital  goods  from  other  households.  Income
contributions  by heusehold  members  working  in  handicrafts,  wood  gathering,
fishing,  and  other  household  farm  activities  were calculated  in  a manner
analogous  to contributions  from  farming  work.  Data on household  members  who
were outside  the  village  at the  time  of the  survey  were provided  by the
remaining  household  members. This  approach  could  be used  because  the  focus  of
the  survey  was on the  household  and its  returns  from  different  labor
allocations. Data  were  not  needed  on the  earnings  of household  members  who
migrated  or on  other  details  concerning  the  absent  migrants'  work  away  from
home.
5.  While  the  use of  a household  decision  framework  obviously
overlooks  any autonomy  of individuals  in their  labor  allocations,  we believe
that  to treat  each  migration  decision  as independent  of a  household  decision
problem  would  entail  far  more severe  limiting  assumptions  than  does- 36-
simplifying  the  analysis  to a household  decision  problem. As the  empirical
results  presented  later  in this  section  demonstrate,  socioeconomic
characteristics  of households  play  a significant  role  in addition  to
characteristics  of individual  household  members  in  explaining  migration
behavior. Moreover,  economic  ties  between  migrants  and their  households  in
the  village  tend  to be very  strong  here,  as in  other  samples  of rural
households  in LDCs. An illustration  of economic  ties  between  migrant  and
household  is given  by remittances. For  all  households  in the  present  sample,
migrant  remittances  account  for  an average  36.5  percent  of total  household
income;  every  household  that  participated  in labor  migration  received
remittances;  and  nearly  -.  f^  snt  of all  migrants  remitted.
6.  The  correl&t  .o  4een  absolute  income  and relative  deprivation
for  the  sample  is -0.41. This low  correlation  indicates  sharp  differences
between  the  income  distributions  of the  two  villages.
7.  Note that,  even if subsistence  concerns  in  poor  households  are
captured  by  absolute  income,  we would  nevertheless  expect  RD to lose  its
positive  effect  on  migre.  on probabilities  in these  households  if relative
income  objectives  are  unimportant  next to survival  objectives. In the  present
sample,  a marginal  increase  in  RD ceases  to have  a positive  effect  on
migration  probabilities  in the  14  percent  of the  sample  that  constituted  the
most relatively  deprived  households.- 37-
Table 1:  Selected  1982  Household  and Individual  Characteri,itcs
Internal  Mexico-to-U.S.
Nonmigrants  migrants  migrants
Household  characteristics
Adilt  family  size
(13  years  or older)  7.84  8.47  9.11
Landholdings  (in  hectares)  4.75  6.48  7.14
Percentage  with family
contacts  (sibling,  parent,
sibling  of parent)  with
internal  migrant
destinations  0.71  0.80  0.57
Percentage  with family
contacts  (sibling,  parent,
sibling  of parent)  at
U.S.  destinations  0.50  0.44  0.89
Wealth  (total  1982  U.S.
dollar  value  of land,
anima_.s,  and  machinery,
in  thousands)  2.11  2.47  3.47
Individual  characteristics
Sex  (male  =  1.0)  0.43  0.49  0.63
Age  33.40  28.48  28.70
Years  of schooling
completed  3.93  6.50  4.06
Years  of internal
migration  experience  0.32  4.75  0.79
Years  of  U.S.  migration
experience  0.76  0.74  4.91
Sample  size  273  80  70- 38 -
Table  2:  Definition  of  Variables
(Time  period:  1982)
Decision  variable
d =  1 if  the  individual  did not  participate  in labor
migration;
2 if  the  individual  was an internal  migrant;
3 if  the  individual  migrated  to the  United  States
Ir.:ome  variables
Y =  instrument  for  total  household  income  without  migration  by
household  member  j9  in thousands  (see  Appendix)
YSQ = Y squared
RD =  instrument  for  relative  deprivation  associated  with Y, in
thousands  (see  Appendix)
RDSQ  =  RD squared
Household  characteristics
SIZE  =  household  size
LAND  = household  landholdings  (in  hectares)
ADULTS  =  number  of adult  household  members  in the  village
WEALTH  =  total  value  of household's  major  physical  assets  (land,
animals,  and  machinery),  in thousands
MEXNET  =  1 if  a close  relative  (sibling,  parent,  sibling  of parent)
of person  j  was  residing  outside  the  village  in  Mexico  at
the  start  of 1982;
O otherwise
USNET  = 1  if  a close  relative  (sibling,  parent,  sibling  of parent)




SEX  =  1 if  male;
O if  female
AGE  =  age
AGESQ  =  age squared
ED  =  highest  level  of schooling  completed
HEAD  =  1 if  the individual  is  a household  head;
O otherwise
MEXEX  = years  of experience  as an internal  migrant
USEX = years  of experience  as a Mexico-to-U.S.  migrant- 39  -
Table  3:  Logit  Results
Estimated  coefficient
Internal  Mexico-to-U.S.
Variable  migration  migration
INTERCEPT  -10.309**  -16.491**
(2.81)  (3.77)
SIZE  0.089  0.063
(0.13)  (0.16)
LAND  0.017  -0.067
(0.06)  (0.06)
ADULTS  0.130  0.422**
(0.19)  (0.23)
Y  0.440  2.501*
(1.36)  (1.90)
YSQ  -0.074  -0.400*
(0.21)  (0.30)
RD  0.109  0.571**
(0.21)  (0.28)
RDSQ  0.004  -0.039**
(0.01)  (0.02)
WEALTH  0.027  0.185
(0.24)  (0.22)
MEXNET  0.374  -0.021
(0.52)  (0.55)
US?ET  -0.315  1.993**
(0.56)  (0.79)
SEX  0.186  0.602*
(0.36)  (0.43)
AGE  0.348**  0.552**
(0.11)  (0.14)- 40 -
Table  3 - Continued
Estimated  coefficient
Internal  Mexico-to-U.S.
Variable  migration  migration
AGESQ  -0.006**  -0.009**
(0.002)  (0.002)
ED  0.266**  -0.129*
(0.06)  (0.09)
HEAD  0.067  -3.129**
(0.82)  (1.09)
MEXEX  0.467**  0.144*
(0.08)  (0.11)
USEX  0.141*  0.487**
(0.10)  (0.09)
Note:  Log-likelihood  -194.22;  *  indicates  significance  at below  the  0.10
level;  **  indicates  significance  at below  the  0.05 level;  standard
errors  appear  in parentheses.- 41  -
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